necessary to revisit the recent history of world economy from a particular perspective, which rests on the use of the concept of the international "non-system".
On writing, in 1983, on Keynesʹs contributions to the Bretton Woods regime, John
Williamson defined the non-system which followed the "Nixon shock" of 1971 (ending the Bretton Woods system itself) as the lack of "a set of generally accepted rules and conventions regarding the proper way for countries to conduct those of their economic policies that have significant repercussions outside their own borders" (87). Now, the economic literature abounds in analyzes of peculiar episodes -such as the East Asian crisis, or the historical saga of the Washington Consensus paradigm -of the post-Bretton Woods international order. Yet few economists have heretofore concentrated on such episodes by adopting a systemic view. The lack of legitimated international economic order has somewhat been taken as a general assumption and the "normality" of the nonsystem has been given for granted, with the result of downplaying the role of the nonsystem as a particular kind of international economic order, albeit an unnatural and perverted one. On the contrary, the construction of a historical narrative of the current non-system (which evidently exceeds the limits of this article), shifting the focus exactly on the lack of a true, legitimate and rational global economic order, helps to understand the shortcomings of the current international architecture in a fresh way. These latter would firstly appear as the byproduct of deliberate decision taken by policy-makers of the world powers, although for purposes not necessarily connected with the resulting international non-system; a second and more focused glance would reveal their instrumental character, that is their being functional to constructing the international economic order which has developed in the last decades.
The disciplinary order of the Washington Consensus
The story of the Washington Consensus provides a perfect illustration in this regard. As any developing region, Latin America had relied on external borrowing to finance its growth strategies in the postwar period. World recession in the Seventies, coupled with the sharp rise of oil prices were responsible for a liquidity crunch which laid the seeds of the debt crisis in the early Eighties. Yet a decisive step towards the crisis burst was given by interest rate and exchange rate policies of the United States, which then came to the rescue of Latin America by conceding financial assistance through the Brady plan. The term "Washington Consensus" was introduced by John Williamson (1990) in the attempt to show that the neoliberal reforms ("prudent macroeconomic policies, outward orientation, and free market capitalism", p. 18) endorsed by Latin American countries in the aftermath of the crisis were recognized as "correct" by industrialized countries and justified requests for financial assistance. For a number of reasons -the post-cold war world's "urgent and widespread need for an alternative set of ideas on how to organize economic and political life" (Naím 2000: 88) , but also the fact that the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank perceived their task to be that of "storming the citadel of statist development strategies" (Kanbur 1999 : 2) -the reform package was soon adopted by the international financial institutions as policy prescription for development and "correct" recipe to contrast financial crises of the Nineties. Only apparently a paradox, a relevant point which was not included in the list but had close ideological affinity to the ten policy suggestions of the Consensus, namely capital movements liberalization, came to be seen as a basic precondition for recovery: foreign capital should flow again into crisishit countries, in homage to the theory of financial market efficiency and to the benefit of creditors in industrial countries.
The Washington Consensus has been a fairly resoundingly failure, as demonstrated by the economic distress it produced in Latin America, which literally lost a decadeArgentinaʹs collapse in 2001 being due to the adoption of an extreme version of the paradigm -, but also by the negative performances it offered in the context of the Russian and particularly the East Asian crises. Stiglitz (2002) and Post-Keynesian economists have aptly stressed the ant-Keynesian philosophy of the Consensus program. Capital market liberalization had pushed up the value of Asian currencies and produced unmanageable current account deficits. The IMF austerity solution was intended to restore market confidence, but its only result was to further depress the economies, which simply passed oneʹs deficit to another; capital flights made the rest to delay the region's recovery.
Remarkably, in the early Nineties, East Asian countries had been described as luminous examples of the results a country could obtain by following the Consensus. Stiglitz (2002: 213) correctly saw that "Together with the IMF, [the U.S. Treasury] had told countries that followed the "right policies" -the Washington Consensus policies -they would be assured of growth. The East Asian crisis cast doubt on this new worldview unless it could be shown that the problem was not with capitalism, but with the Asian countries and their bad policies. The IMF and the U.S. Treasury had to argue that the problem was not with the reforms ... but with the fact that the reforms had not been carried far enough. By focusing on the weaknesses of the crisis countries ... they attempted to use the experience to push their agenda still further".
Much more was therefore at stake than declaring the end of the "global apartheid which claimed that developing countries came from a different universe" (Williamson 2002: 2) , and the end of development economics with it. As Rodrik (2000) argues, the U.S.
Treasury and international financial institutions used the Washington Consensus (in its various editions: the "augmented" version of the late Nineties sought to remedy the early failures of the paradigm by focusing on institutions) as a means to promote an "integrationist agenda" of hyperglobalization and (which amounts to the same thing) a safer world for capitals -liberalization of their flows being thus not a precondition of freemarket economy but the veritable ultimate end of the agenda. Worthy of careful attention is the theoretical framework used by Rodrik to illustrate this assertion. What he calls the world economy "trilemma" compels to pick two and only two between a) full integration of world markets, b) democracy and c) national sovereignty, so as to obtain the mutually exclusive options of global federalism (a-b), the "golden straitjacket" of the Consensus (ac), and a new "Bretton Woods compromise". This helps to understand that todayʹs nonsystem partly derives in truth from this failed attempt to construct an international economic order entirely based on market discipline.
Keynesʹs complexity approach to international economic relations
The current nostalgia for the "embedded liberalism" (Ruggie 1982 ) of the Bretton Woods order -felt by Rodrik (2011 ) himself, Chang (2008 (Cedrini 2008) . What is at stake is not so much, to put it differently, the anti-Keynesian character of the Consensus orthodoxy -the IMF acted to impose the "global conformity to an economic orthodoxy
[that] Keynes had rejected", writes Newton (2006: 5) -but the fact itself that it has been imposed, and that it has been imposed as such, that is as an orthodoxy.
As a recent strand in the literature is suggesting Cedrini 2010a, Vines 2003 ; see also Kirshner 2009), Keynesʹs international macroeconomics is the result of the development of an extremely powerful "complexity approach" to international economic relations. This approach provides clear continuity with his general conception of economics as a moral rather than positivist science, to be more properly identified with a way of reasoning about a complex economic material, made up of "motives, expectations, psychological uncertainties" (CW 14: 400). Keynesʹs theory of economics is a framework to deal with a social world which is not explicable in terms of the individual behavior of its separate parts; that is, in terms of micro-foundations and rational action theory.
Consistently with the analysis of the fallacy of composition between particular and general interests he sketched out in The End of Laissez-Faire, Keynes conceived the international economic order as a complex object showing latent and actual conflicts, and had an "extraordinarily clear understanding of how pieces of the global economy interact, driven by the policies of autonomous nations, in an only partly coherent manner" (Vines 2003: 339) .
His international macroeconomics after the end of the pre-war gold standard led by Britain -which he wanted to reform along lines developed in Indian Currency and Finance (1913) -was the attempt to efficiently cope with the "dilemma of the international system" (CW 6: 272). In A Treatise on Money, having in mind the serious constraints posed on policy space by the renewed gold standard of the interwar period, he identified such dilemmas with the clash between the needs prescribed by international discipline (as regards, in particular, exchange rates in terms of the international standard) and those inherent to the right to national autonomy (as concerns interest rates and foreign lending). Keynes devoted the Twenties and Thirties to the search for a model of national behavior consistent with the general interests of the system (Moggridge 1986 ). He finally found it, as the discussion of mercantilism from the point of view of the whole system makes evident in the General Theory, in the "twice blessed" (CW 7: 349) policies of regaining control over the interest rate, whereby countries could reach and maintain full employment and help their neighbors, at the same time, to achieve this same result. With the plan for an International Currency Union (ICU) in the Forties, he offered a scheme of global architecture explicitly devised to defend and promote policy space in an overall expansionary environment, through a mix of truly international currency, symmetric adjustment, possibility of capital controls and fully accommodating global monetary policy.
The ICU should provide, in other words, an international "central control" (CW 7: 379) of the kind of those justified by Keynes, in the General Theory, as means to attain full employment while safeguarding the "traditional advantages of individualism", that is "personal liberty" and the "variety of life" which emerges from such widened "field for exercise of personal choice" (380). Although the ICU plan is usually regarded as the effort to reduce the asymmetry of international adjustment, its final aim was exactly to safeguard each countryʹs right to policy space and therefore to variety in defining its own version of national capitalism. The somewhat heretic proposal of an American gift, at the end of World War II, to an exhausted Britain -who had financed the Alliesʹ war against Germany and incurred in enormous debts with both the United States and the sterling area -provides a clear, both practical and symbolic illustration of the kind of international order desired by Keynes (see Carabelli and Cedrini 2010a) . By granting a gift as a retrospective contribution to the financing of the war, he argued, the United States would have offered Britain the freedom to actively contribute to "the kind of [multilateral freetrade] post-war world" (CW 24: 328) on which the Americans had "set their hearts" (280), the same that Britain herself was willing to implement by marching "side by side" (316) with the Americans. A world that the discipline and weight of a business loan, compelling
Britain to accept what would have been regarded as the "American conception of the international economic system" (61), would have conversely put at high risk. More in general, what Keynes had in mind was a system wherein creditors take the initiative to reduce global imbalances by granting debtor countries the freedom to choose their own path to development and growth, which in the end would accrue, as the experience of the Marshall plan suggests, to the benefit of creditors themselves.
Rodrik and other nostalgics of the Bretton Woods order are right in opposing "the diversity of national policy" the system could not structurally interfere with, as Keynes himself observed (CW 24: 608) in defending the agreement, to the "outside dictation" (Keynes again, this time on the gold standard; CW 26: 33) of the Washington Consensus.
Still, though a complete reversal of the Bretton Woods philosophy, the Consensus has its ultimate roots in the disciplinary mandate Harry Dexter Whiteʹs scheme assigned to the regimeʹs institutions, whereas Keynesʹs plans, which assigned technical, not political mandate to the IMF and the World Bank, were explicitly conceived in the awareness that "distinct national circumstances implied that heterogeneity, not homogeneity was appropriate across various states' macroeconomic policies" (Kirshner 2009: 534) . Freedom of capital movements, the main pillar (pace Williamson) of the Consensus, should have surrendered when clashing with each countryʹs freedom to choose its own macroeconomic policies. Keynes directly, not generically the architects of Bretton Woods, is thence the economist we are not slave of.
The unreasonable system of "Bretton Woods 2" and the problem of global imbalances
Despite its "blocked" structure, the so-called "Bretton Woods 2" system seems more respectful of policy space than the aborted Consensus order. This is not a paradox, since the fictitious spontaneity of BW2 is in truth a direct legacy of the Consensus attempt to impose discipline as the main rule of the international order. According to the original (pre-crisis) BW2 narrative (Dooley et al. 2003) , Asian countries implement export-led growth strategies supported by undervalued exchange rates, capital and trade controls, and international reserves accumulation, with the aim of regaining a central position in the world system. Their mercantilism would result in happily sustaining the dollar's value and assisting the central country and world growth locomotive, the United States, in financing its deficit. The view is highly controversial: a huge debate has developed centering on the true reasons lying behind the most salient aspect of BW2, that is the unprecedented and costly accumulation of foreign exchange reserves by emerging markets. For sure, the strategy was taken "in the context of the decision to adopt or reinforce the neo-liberal strategy of rapid financial liberalisation, unrelated to the development of either deep financial markets or mature and effective regulatory structures" (Cruz and Walters 2008: 666-7) . The moral developing nations have drawn from the Consensus saga is that it is safer, in a financially liberalized world, to rely on selfprotection through increased liquidity rather than on external borrowing (Feldstein 1999 "Wonderfully few … countries have yet learn that gold reserves, although no doubt they serve some purpose when they are held for show only, exist to much better purpose if they are held for use also" (125), he argued: on discussing the 1914 crisis, he added that "although many countries hold large quantities of gold, there are but few which pursue a rational policy in regard to it. At considerable cost they build up large reserves in quiet times presumably with a view to the next crisis; but when the crisis comes mistaken policy renders them as little able to use gold as if it were not there at all (CW 11: 247) .
In truth, it appears that todayʹs emerging countries did use international reserves, and effectively so, in the attempt to protect themselves from "double drain" crisis scenarios with banking problems and capital flights ). Yet there have also been signs of reluctance to draw down reserves, for "fear of losing international reserves, which may signal a deterioration in the credit worthiness of a country" (Aizenman 2009: 17) . Keynesʹs 1913 words about the international economic system acquire the utmost importance and freshness once the specific perspective of the current non-system is adopted in making the parallel. Suffice it to reread page 71 of Indian Currency and Finance: we have never developed the ability -which Keynes invoked to justify his "rational" reform -to cope with the spectacular effects of "a change of ideas in Asia" (the passage to "undervaluation-cum-intervention" strategies after the 1997 collapse). Asia has truly by now "turned the tables on the West", but we have not learned yet how to control "the most intimate adjustments" of our "economic organism". A direct legacy of Keynesʹs complexity approach to international economic relations is that in a structurally uncertain environment, systems and policies must rest on deliberate decisions taken on the basis of probable judgment (neither absolute rationality nor truth). They must be "rational", that is to say, they must ground themselves on reasonable, neither arbitrary nor irrational judgments, and they must not depend on the fulfillment of expectations, for mere luck does not turn foolish judgments into reasonable judgments. If the BW2 regime, combining expensiveness with instability, is a byproduct of the attempted Consensus order, the unintended evolution that has transformed global imbalances into an engine of global growth (under the tacit assumption of ever-growing American demand for foreign goods) neither make them reasonable, nor justifies inactivity with regard to their persistence.
Here too, as Davidson (2009) (2010) would not suffice, and should rather be coupled with a Keynes-inspired proviso of symmetric adjustment. But Keynes could not reasonably predict the abnormal patterns of todayʹs global imbalances, with peripheral developing countries in a surplus position and the world superpower and growth locomotive, the United States, acting as the systemʹs deficit of last resort. Not only is a new international adjustment mechanism required, but also a mechanism which is "also sufficiently compatible with global aggregate demand to provide full employment and support the national development strategies of developing countries" (Kregel 2009: 5) . The desired mix of full employment and maintenance of the global standardʹs purchasing power is not the automatic result of the introduction of the ICU plan, but the product of coordinated symmetric adjustment policies, that is of "coordinated policy action taken mutually by members of the clearing union" (2). As Kregel (2006) , that developed countries should grow through internal demand rather than by those policies which developing countries are (and should be) allowed to use in order to fill their gap with the former.
The European debt impasse in the light of Keynesʹs The Economic Consequences of the Peace
If Germanyʹs enormous surplus, deriving from sluggish domestic growth, restrictive monetary and fiscal policies, and low-wages strategies, has generally gone unobserved for a decade, it is only because in that same period, Europe -which obviously participated in the global-imbalances game, its firms being engaged in acquiring American assets and technology while keeping the value of their US subsidiaries' profits stable and protecting investment at home too (Kregel 2006 ) -has been in equilibrium with the rest of the world.
The recent European debt impasse has quite naturally lifted the veil on Germany, and revealed that the European economic architecture shares many of the flaws which affect the international order, in primis the inability to cope with its imbalances and to restart growth through adequate countermeasures to the downturn. In truth, the European debt crisis has its origins exactly in the global financial collapse, which is responsible (via financial bailouts and fiscal stimulus packages) for the rise in public debts especially in Southern countries (Papadimitriou and Wray 2012) The Euro area Heads of State or Government summit of 21 July 2011 concluded that «all euro countries solemnly reaffirm their inflexible determination to honour fully their own individual sovereign signature and all their commitments to sustainable fiscal conditions and structural reforms». The Governing Council considers that Italy needs to urgently underpin the standing of its sovereign signature and its commitment to fiscal sustainability and structural reforms.
The Italian Government has decided to pursue a balanced budget in 2014 and, to this purpose, has recently introduced a fiscal package. These are important steps, but not sufficient.
At the current juncture, we consider the following measures as essential:
1. We see a need for significant measures to enhance potential growth. A few recent decisions taken by the Government move in this direction; other measures are under discussion with social partners. However, more needs to be done and it is crucial to go forward decisively. Key challenges are to increase competition, particularly in services to improve the quality of public services and to design regulatory and fiscal systems better suited to support firmsʹ competitiveness and efficiency of the labour market. a) A comprehensive, far-reaching and credible reform strategy, including the full liberalisation of local public services and of professional services is needed. This should apply particularly to the provision of local services through large scale privatizations.
b) There is also a need to further reform the collective wage bargaining system allowing firm-level agreements to tailor wages and working conditions to firmsʹ specific needs and increasing their relevance with respect to other layers of negotiations. The June 28 agreement between the main trade unions and the industrial businesses associations moves in this direction. c) A thorough review of the rules regulating the hiring and dismissal of employees should be adopted in conjunction with the establishment of an unemployment insurance system and a set of active labour market policies capable of easing the reallocation of resources towards the more competitive firms and sectors.
2. The government needs to take immediate and bold measures to ensuring the sustainability of public finances. a) Additional-corrective fiscal measures is needed. We consider essential for the Italian authorities to front-load the measures adopted in the July 2011 package by at least one year. The aim should be to achieve a better-than-planned fiscal deficit in 2011, a net borrowing of 1.0% in 2012 and a balanced budget in 2013, mainly via expenditure cuts. It is possible to intervene further in the pension system, making more stringent the eligibility criteria for seniority pensions and rapidly aligning the retirement age of women in the private sector to that established for public employees. thereby achieving savings already in 2012. In addition, the government should consider significantly reducing the cost of public employees, by strengthening turnover rules and, if necessary, by reducing wages. b) An automatic deficit reducing clause should be introduced stating that any slippages from deficit targets will be automatically compensated through horizontal cuts on discretionary expenditures. c) Borrowing, including commercial debt and expenditures of regional and local governments should be placed under tight control, in line with the principles of the ongoing reform of intergovernmental fiscal relations.
In view of the severity of the current financial market situation, we regard as crucial that all actions listed in section 1 and 2 above be taken as soon as possible with decreelaws, followed by Parliamentary ratification by end September 2011. A constitutional reform tightening fiscal rules would also be appropriate.
3. We also encourage the government to immediately take measures to ensure a major overhaul of the public administration in order to improve administrative efficiency and business friendliness. In public entities the use of performance indicators should be systematic (especially in the health, education and judiciary systems). There is a need for a strong commitment to abolish or consolidate some intermediary administrative layers (such as the provinces). Actions aimed at exploiting economies of scale in local public services should be strengthened.
We trust that the Government will take all the appropriate actions. The similarity of approach is evident. The ECBʹs "austerity solution" for deficit countries like Italy is in truth a Bruxelles-version of the Washington Consensus recipe for developed countries. The country most severely hit by both the confidence crisis and the austerity solution is Greece, due to the astonishing volume of its public debt and the fact that the government had lied about its deficit when taking the decision to enter the Euro area. This latter circumstance lies evidently at the basis of the "Northern diagnosis", as De Grauwe (2011) calls the view whereby government profligacy is the true responsible for the crisis, and deterrent sanctions on todayʹs deviants are required to prevention future economic crimes.
There are now countless commentaries on economic newspapers (e.g. Summers
2011, Krugman 2011) which make references to Keynesʹs The Economic Consequences of the
Peace to highlight the impossibility for Greece to remedy her situation through austerity, and rightly so, but little consideration for the imaginative work of practical economic diplomacy which Keynes made visible in the book. Here is a shining example of his complexity approach to international economic relations (see Carabelli and Cedrini 2010b) .
After describing the economic continent as a "body" characterized by "economic solidarity" between its parts, Keynes recognized that Germanyʹs creditors were caught in an irresoluble "dilemma" (CW 2: 58): due to the burden of Inter-Allied debts, they could not recede from asking Germany for impossible indemnities. By so doing, being so "deeply and inextricably intertwined with their victims by hidden psychic and economic bonds" (2), the Allies were in truth inviting not only Germanyʹs destruction, but also their own. Keynes argued that Britain should have renounced her share of reparations in cash to the advantage of the Allies, and made an "inevitable" (92) appeal to "the generosity of the United States" (93).
This latter was absolutely crucial: "the financial problems which were about to exercise Europe could not be solved by greed. The possibility of their cure lay in magnanimity. Europe, if she is to survive her troubles, will need so much magnanimity from America, that she must herself practice it. It is useless for the Allies, hot from stripping Germany and one another, to turn for help to the United States to put the States of Europe, including Germany, on to their feet again" (92). Debts forgiveness was therefore conceived as a necessary precondition for Keynes's "grand scheme for the rehabilitation of Europe" (CW 16: 428), a "shared-responsibilities" plan of an international loan requiring the whole spectrum of countries involved to participate in the reconstruction. Keynes saw American assistance to the continent (including Germany's creditors) as the required ignition key allowing a spiral movement of magnanimity to spread along the chain of countries disposed to take part in the "grand scheme". Only a gift, acting as a "strange attractor", could provide the starting engine for this movement towards a more balanced international economy. Creditors should assume their responsibility.
Greece is now in the same position as Germany in 1919. The Northern diagnosis tells us that if borrowers are guilty of the impasse, they have to repay their debt; they have therefore to consume less and pay more taxes, with unchanged income. But the only possibility to realize savings on both the private and the public front without income reduction is offered by a trade surplus, and this requires cooperative trade partners, which Germany is not. The developing-country growth strategy adopted by Berlin throughout the decade is responsible for her lending policy to the rest of Europe, and Greece in particular. In Kregelʹs (2011: 9) fascinatingly clear words: "countries with undervalued currencies have higher rates of income growth than consumption growth, and as a result have higher savings rates … But for every undervalued currency there must be an overvalued currency, suggesting that the "behavior" of the GIPS (Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain) is no more inherent in their culture than the fact that the EU GDP manages to grow at a positive rate, given German policies. And it is Germany's refusal to cooperate in a collective policy that imposes the opposite behavior on its eurozone trading partners".
Rodrik (2010) takes the same view: "If others borrowed too much, doesnʹt it follow that Germans lent excessively?". And this is exactly the same argument used by Stiglitz (2003: 83) in treating the Asian crisis and the Washington Consensus: "for every [Asian] borrower there is a lender [from developed countries], and the lender is as much to blame as the borrower".
On Keynesʹs legacy in the times of the crisis
The illegitimate moralistic aspect of the Northern diagnosis has interesting implications for the historical parallel with Keynesʹs times, and for an assessment of Keynesʹs legacy in the times of the crisis. Let us first note that the 1945 memorandum on post-war Britain was but an updated version of the model of international adjustment outlined in The Economic
Consequences of the Peace. Both result from Keynesʹs belief that "interdependence required management, and that a ʹleaderʹ was a great asset (if not an essential one) in doing this" (Markwell 1995: 209) : hence the attempt to "imbue the new hegemonic centre, the United States, with the behavior and ethics which pertain to the world creditor power" (Ferrari Bravo 1990, 407; our translation) . This means that Germany has substantially failed as leader of the European continent: "the solution to the Euro crisis is in Germany, not in
Greece" (Kregel 2011: 8) Not even the European Union, with its promises of freedom, has succeeded in ensuring "the proper liberty of each country over its own economic fortunes" (CW 25: 11).
We are thus back to the main issue at stake at the beginning of the story of the neo-liberal non-system: like some uncelebrated antecedents such as the inter-war period gold standard, the unrestricted laissez-faire of its main supporters has once again "mistake [n] private licence for public liberty" (CW 24: 622), and totally disregarded each memberʹs right to national autonomy. A main lesson one can draw from revisiting the non-system in historical perspective is that we are definitely not slave of Keynes, but also that we are free to take inspiration from him, if our aim is to construct a radically different alternative to the current state of international affairs.
